

**DOC A: GARETH JONES, "GERMANY UNDER THE RULE OF HITLER: DEATH BLOW TO DEMOCRACY," from THE WESTERN MAIL & SOUTH WALES NEWS, June 5th 1933**

The Brown Shirts are now masters of Germany. Every day in Berlin they march through streets bedecked with red, black, and white Nazi flags to the sound of those military marches which are rousing young Germany to a passionate militant love of their Fatherland. Eager crowds line the streets for each parade and, stretching out their right hands, call with ecstatic enthusiasm, "Heil, Hitler!"

I have for my leader;" said one leading Nazi to me, "a love which is as deep as my love for my country, and I have in him a faith than which no faith, even faith in religion, could be deeper. Hitler can never be wrong, and his orders I shall carry out to the death." Imbued with such devotion to Hitler, the Nazi Brown Shirts have, under his command, carried out a revolution which can be ranked with the Bolshevik and the Fascist Revolutions.

The German National Revolution, although possessing a far narrower economic and philosophical foundation than that brought about by Lenin, has certainly been more rapid than its Russian counterpart. The Brown Shirts in three months have been able to gain power and dig themselves well in without the ravages of a civil war and without the delay of several years, which elapsed in Italy before Mussolini took over full power. The lightning pace of the National-Socialist triumph makes the French Revolution appear almost like prolonged slow motion.

They have put one party, and one party only, into control, and that is the National-Socialist party, which become as all-powerful as the Communists in Russia and the Fascists in Italy. The Nazis (pronounced Natsi-s) have put themselves into the position of leaders in the universities, in all committees, in factories, on boards of directors, in schools, in public offices. Most positions of trust are now held by members of the party.

...Such have been the main lines of the national revolution. The Nazis' actions combine a powerful idealism with a mediæval intolerance and unselfish devotion to an aim and a leader with a brutal disregard of justice and fairplay to the individual. Liberal-minded people have been shocked by the similarity which Nazi decrees have with former reactionary measures, and the treatment of the Jews has caused a revulsion of feeling which is shared by millions of Germans within the borders of Germany.

**DOC B: HITLER SPEECH OF JANUARY 30, 1937 AT THE REICHSTAG, BERLIN**

MEN! Deputies of the German Reichstag! The Reichstag has met today on a day momentous for the German people. Four years have passed since the greatest national revolution and reformation that Germany has ever experienced began. These were the four years which I asked for as a trial period...

I do not know whether there has ever been such a thorough revolution as ours, which nevertheless left unmolested generous former political functionaries and allowed them to work in peace and paid pensions to its bitterest enemies.

Within a few weeks the social prejudices of a thousand years were swept away. So great was the Revolution that its spiritual foundations have not been understood even today by a superficial world. They speak of democracies and

dictatorships, and have not realized that in this country a Revolution has taken place that can be described as democratic in the highest sense of the word. Does a more glorious socialism or a truer democracy exist than that which enables any German boy to find his way to the head of the nation? The purpose of the Revolution was not to deprive a privileged class of its rights, but to raise a class without rights to equality....

There is now only one representative of German sovereignty - the people itself.

The will of the people finds its expression in the Party as its political organization.

Therefore there is only one legislative body. There is only one executive authority.

Therefore the people is the basis, and Party, State, Army, industry, justice, etc., are only the means of maintaining the people.

In a new penal code, justice will be put for all time into the service of maintaining the German race.

When I took over power there were more than 6,000,000 unemployed and the farmers seemed doomed to decay. Today you must admit that I have fulfilled my promises. . .

The Four-Year Plan will give permanent employment to those workmen who are now being released from the armament industry. It is significant for the gigantic economic development of our people that there is today a lack of trained workmen in many industries. There will be no strikes or lockouts in Germany, because every one has to serve the interests of the entire nation.

Education of the people will never come to an end, and this education includes the Hitler Youth, the Labor Service, the Party, and the Army, as well as books, newspapers, theaters, and films.

***DOC C: Excerpt from M. Hughes, Nationalism and Society, Germany 1800-1945, 1988***

The greatest success of the National Socialist regime was in its propaganda. Large numbers of Germans became convinced as a result of Goebbels' efforts that they did live in a genuine Volksgemeinschaft. This was increased by symbolic devices such as the cheap Volkswagen car and Volksempfänger radio receiver, putting what had previously been luxury goods within the reach of ordinary Germans, and party-encouraged mass participation in the Winterhilfe social security scheme. The reality was very different. The promise of "national revolution," the creation of a classless German society with equality of opportunity for all, and a new criteria of worth to the nation, was not fulfilled.

The impression of a kind of compulsory national unity was achieved by institutions such as the labor Service, eventually obligatory for all young Germans, and the process known as "standardization" (Gleichaltung). Under this a large number of National Socialist organizations were given monopoly powers within their own fields and commissioned to carry out a political education role. As membership of such bodies was usually compulsory for people engaged in a given profession, as was involvement in organized activities, a false air of unity could be created.

**DOC D: A December 1936 report to Sopade. Sopade was the name of the exile organization of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). It operated in Prague from 1933 to 1938 and from 1938 to 1945 in Paris.**

Bavarian Motorworks (BMW), Munich: Since wages are relatively high in comparison to other metal industries, mood among workers is accordingly less bitter. One can, however, report that the National Socialists have nothing that they can announce. Even though the workers do not express it publicly, one sense that the workers will never be conquered by National Socialism. All must, of course, yield to the current pressure, but whenever possible they show that they really have very little interest in all of Hitler's gibberish. This attitude was quite obvious during the last speech by the Party at which a communal radio listening had been ordered.

During the speech the workers conversed amongst themselves so much that the factory SA had to intervene to restore order. During the last third of the broadcast there occurred a sudden round of applause over the loudspeaker; whereupon the workers ran for the doors, demanding to be let out as they thought the speech had ended. The gate attendants were taken by surprise as a general race for the exits ensued. Yes, even windows were opened and people squeezed through them as though they were fugitives...Even the Nazi supporters in the factory, of which there are still a few in the group, say that the broadcasts of the speeches in fact do more harm than good for National Socialism."

**DOC E: Excerpt from Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1993**

Recent research...which paints an extremely complex picture of social behavior and attitudes in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Reich, suggests strongly that it is easy to exaggerate the nature of changes in values and attitudes under Nazism having effected a social revolution.

There was some penetration of Nazi values and attitudes, but the regime's social propaganda made little serious dent in traditional class loyalties, particularly among older industrial workers...The hold of the church and clergy over the population, especially in country areas, was strengthened rather than weakened by the "church struggle..." Nazi policy often failed categorically to break down religious allegiance. Even in their attempt to inculcate the German people with racial, eugenic, and social Darwinist values – the core of their ideology – the Nazis, it appears, had only limited success. Enhancement of existing prejudice against Jews and other racial minorities and "social outsiders" unquestionably occurred...but...exposure to Nazi race values had come nowhere near completely eradicating conventional moral standards.

Much suggests that the Nazis had made their greatest impact on young Germans...but even here the regime had only partial success...Signs of conflict, tension, and opposition within certain sections of German youth were already apparent by the later 1930s and increased in the war years, suggesting that the Nazis had been only temporarily successful in winning over, mobilizing, and integrating young Germans.

Doc F

Was Slaughter of Jews Embraced by Germans? *A review of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's **HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*** By Richard Bernstein

A basic question posed by students of the Holocaust has to do with the psychology of the ordinary perpetrators of the genocide against the Jews. How, some scholars have asked, did those who carried out the slaughter overcome the moral scruples it would be normal to feel when faced with the annihilation of an entire people, a far-flung people, moreover, that posed no threat to the German homeland.

That is the wrong question, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen argues in this masterly, powerfully argued book. *Hitler's Willing Executioners* is an attempt to demolish the standard views about Germans and the Holocaust by arguing that when it came to the Jews, average Germans had no moral scruples to overcome in the first place. Goldhagen states:

*The German perpetrators of the Holocaust treated Jews in all the brutal and lethal ways that they did because, by and large, they believed that what they were doing was right and necessary. Second, ... there was long existing, virulent antisemitism in German society that led to the desire on the part of the vast majority of Germans to eliminate Jews somehow from German society. Third, ... any explanation of the Holocaust must address the ... relationship between antisemitism in Germany and the persecution and extermination of the Jews which so many ordinary Germans contributed to and supported.*

The perpetrators of the anti-Jewish slaughter, Mr. Goldhagen contends, did not kill Jews because of threats or some German propensity for obeying authority. They participated in the slaughter because they were steeped in a historical culture of anti-Semitism. They tortured and massacred Jews, starved them, toyed with them, punished them for their birth, and they did so voluntarily, even eagerly, with unsurpassable malice and cruelty.

Mr. Goldhagen, an assistant professor of government and social studies at Harvard, has not eliminated all possibility of disagreement with his thesis. He may underestimate the effects of pervasive state terror, the puniness of the individual living in the leviathan state. Other recent historical horrors -- Stalin's terror, the Cultural Revolution in China -- show that mass fealty can be whipped up by a totalitarian leader, operating in an atmosphere of state terror, without any particularly deep, preceding cultural hatred for the victim groups.

Mr. Goldhagen's morally unsparing analysis will no doubt provoke much debate and quite likely some protest. He is, after all, essentially saying that the crime of the Holocaust was the reflection of a special iniquity lying within the German culture and the German people. That seems almost too extreme a conclusion to be true. But Mr. Goldhagen reminds us that near the end of the war, the Germans were ordered by Himmler to stop the killing, but they continued anyway...

Doc G

## Hitler's Co-Conspirators by Benjamin Schwarz

Three decades of scholarship reveal that from the very onset of the war, it was impossible not to know the Jews' fate. Soldiers and officers wrote home of mass shootings (one letter explicitly details the massacre of 30,000 Jews in a single town), and when they returned on leave, they spoke of the murders in private and in public. Reports of the killing squads, which detailed the number of murders, were routinely routed to midlevel bureaucrats in various departments in Berlin. The "White Rose" student resistance movement in Munich declared in its 1942 manifesto that 300,000 Jews had been killed in Poland, a crime "unparalleled in the whole of history" ... When the BBC beamed detailed descriptions of the workings of the death camps to Germany in 1942, the Viennese diarist Ludwig Haydn said that "with regard to the mass murder of Jews, the broadcast merely confirms what we know here anyhow." Richard Evans explains:

*Railway timetable clerks, engine drivers and train drivers and other staff on stations and in goods yards could all identify the trains and knew where they were going. Policemen rounding up the Jews or dealing with their files or their property knew as well. Housing officials who reassigned the Jews' dwellings to Germans, administrators who dealt with the Jews' property—the list was almost endless ... The mass murder of the Jews thus became a kind of open secret in Germany from the end of 1942 at the very latest.*

Germans responded to this knowledge in various but all-too-predictable ways. True, Nazi rule had ... altered popular attitudes, so by 1939 most Germans believed that Jews should be segregated or removed from the "folk community." But the anti-Semitism of most Germans stopped far short of genocide—only a small minority overtly approved of the Nazis' war against the Jews. [But] whatever their private feelings, most Germans responded outwardly with indifference ... knowing "enough to know that it was better not to know more." Although certainly not a commendable stance, it's hardly surprising. For one thing, as Ian Kershaw writes, "the vast majority of Germans had plenty of other things on their mind." The Final Solution reached its height just as Germany's military fortunes began to ebb. Severe wartime privations, ever-mounting death tolls, growing anxiety about the fate of loved ones engaged in a savage and increasingly desperate struggle on an ever-retreating Eastern Front, the disintegration of everyday life caused by an ever-intensifying Allied bombing offensive against Germany's cities—all crimped human empathy, to say nothing of collective action.

So, obviously, did fear. Throughout his history, Evans has chronicled the corrosive effects on German society of the Nazis' network of surveillance and intimidation. He perceptively highlights the effectiveness of the Nazi state's coercive methods ..., and the constrictions thus imposed on even the most innocent individual action.

Doc H

From Richard Evans, The 3rd Reich in Power, 2005

It was not only the third or so of the population who had been committed to the Marxist left before 1933 that was subject to massive intimidation. Indeed, scarcely had the murderous violence of the 'Night of the Long Knives' receded, than an even larger minority than the Marxists, that of the German Catholics, began to be prosecuted and imprisoned as they gave vent to their increasingly critical views of the regime in public. More general still were measures such as the Law on Malicious Gossip, which clamped down on the most trivial expressions of dissent and put people who told jokes about Hitler and Göring in prison. These were mainly members of the German working class, it is true, but the working class after all made up around half the entire population, and middle- and even upper-class offenders in this respect were brought before the Special Courts as well. Successful prosecutions under this law were a further instrument of mass intimidation, adding to the general climate of fear and helping to create the spiral of silence in which the regime could commit ever greater crimes without fear of public censure or opposition.<sup>240</sup>

The truth is that far from Nazi terror being levelled exclusively against small and despised minorities, the threat of arrest, prosecution and incarceration in increasingly brutal and violent conditions loomed over everyone in the Third Reich, even, as we have seen in the cases brought before the Special Courts, over members of the Nazi Party itself. The regime intimidated Germans into acquiescence, visiting a whole range of sanctions upon those who dared to oppose it, systematically disorienting people, and depriving them of their traditional social and cultural milieux, such as the pub or the club or the voluntary association, above all where these could be seen as a potential source of resistance, as in the case of the labour movement. Fear and terror were integral parts of the Nazis' armoury of political weapons from the very beginning.<sup>241</sup> The state and the Party could use them because within a few months of

Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor, they had systematically deprived all Germans of virtually every basic human and civil right they had enjoyed under the Weimar Republic. The law was no protection against the state if the state or any of its agencies suspected that a citizen was disinclined to demonstrate approval of its policies and purposes. On the contrary, vast numbers of new, often draconian laws were decreed that gave the police, the Gestapo and the SS a virtual *carte blanche* to deal with anyone suspected of deviating from the norms of human behaviour laid down by the Third Reich for its citizens. In this situation, it was not surprising that ordinary people and lower-level officials of the Nazi Party began to reinforce the atmosphere of pervasive terror and intimidation by sending their own unsolicited denunciations of deviants to the Gestapo.

At the same time, the Gestapo was only one part of a much wider net of surveillance, terror and persecution cast by the Nazi regime over German society in the 1930s; others included the SA and SS, the Criminal Police, the prison service, the social services and employment offices, the medical profession, health centres and hospitals, the Hitler Youth, the Block Wardens and even apparently politically neutral organizations like tax offices, the railway and the post office. All of these furnished information about deviants and dissidents to the Gestapo, the courts and the prosecution service, forming a polymorphous, uncoordinated but pervasive system of control in which the Gestapo was merely one institution among many.<sup>242</sup> Everything that happened in the Third Reich took place in this pervasive atmosphere of fear and terror, which never slackened and indeed became far more intense towards the end. 'Do you know what fear is?' an elderly worker asked an interviewer some years after it was all over: 'No. The Third Reich was fear.'<sup>243</sup> Yet terrorism was only one of the Third Reich's techniques of rule. For the Nazis did not just seek to batter the population into passive, sullen acquiescence. They also wanted to rouse it into positive, enthusiastic endorsement of their ideals and their policies, to change people's minds and spirits and to create a new German culture that would reflect their values alone. This meant propaganda, and here too, as we shall now see, they went to unprecedented lengths to achieve their aims.